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RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY FACES ISSUES OF THE DAY AND OF THE 
CENTURY - CHURCH AND SOCIETY, RELIGIOUS PLURALISM, 
MARTYRS AND MISSION. 
by Walter Sawatsky1
 
Walter Sawatsky, the editor of REE since 1997, is Professor of 
Church History and Mission at Associated Mennonite Biblical 
Seminary, Elkhart IN, as well as consultant on East/West for 
Mennonite Central Committee. His doctorate is in Russian history. 
He has contributed numerous articles to historical and missiological 
journals in recent years on issues of proselytism, ecumenism, and 
theological education. 
 
 The bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), under the leadership 
of Patriarch Alexei II,  took a series of actions at their Council in August 2000 that 
were of such broad import that they must be seen as an agenda statement for a new 
decade, if not a new century. There was a decision on the canonization of Tsar 
Nicholas II’s family, as “passion bearers”, on the grounds of the manner in which 
they submitted to their executions. Two major official statements on social doctrine 
and on ecumenism and religious pluralism were presented and approved. A long list 
of 20th century martyrs during the Communist era were named. That is, after more 
or less a decade of work and some internal debate, Russian Orthodox leaders were 
addressing the most serious traumas and testing of the 20th century while proposing 
a teaching and practice stance for the new Russia. The statements were 
unprecedented and their content and implications are so major that there must 
surely be wide ranging discussion and debate within ROC circles and Russian 
society as a whole. This paper seeks to present a critical overview of what is at 
 
1An earlier version was presented at a panel on Russian Orthodoxy After the 
Bishops Council of 2000 at the November 2001 convention of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. This revised version, presented 
at the annual meeting of CAREE in March 2002, was changed to provide brief 
summaries of the arguments of two other panelists (Professors Tom Bird and Alex 
Agadjanian referred to below) in order to draw attention to the way in which major 
decisions of the August Sobor were interrelated. 
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stake, especially with reference to relationships to other churches, both inside 
Russia and internationally. 
 
I. THE JUBILEE COUNCIL IN CONTEXT 
 Although meetings of the synod of bishops of the of the Russian Orthodox 
Church (ROC)  became more regular after 1990, the Bishops’ synod of 1994 was 
memorable for the way in which major differences, virtual fissures within Orthodox 
leadership, were so prominent that the council nearly acted to withdraw from the 
ecumenical movement. On the other hand, it was also at this meeting that there was 
a call for developing teaching materials in missiology for seminarians, and to 
launch a major new mission initiative. Also in 1994 Metropolitan Kirill of the 
External Church Relations Department appointed staff to begin drafting a social 
doctrine.2 When the bishops gathered for their Jubilee Sobor in August of 2000 the 
divisions between conservatives and liberal or ecumenical churchmen were still a 
major point of alignment, but the ROC leadership was not contemplating drastic 
actions in either direction. Instead the Jubilee Synod met with a self-consciousness 
of a new millennium beginning, a sense of urgent tasks in society to which they 
must address themselves positively, and that therefore a compromise between the 
contrasting ideologies that various bishops supported would be found. 
 Hence it was readily acknowledged that the conservatives secured a 
modified canonisation of the last Tsar, Nicholas II, plus a long list of martyrs of the 
Soviet persecutions were named. Metropolitan Kirill and his Department of 
External Relations of the Patriarchate secured surprisingly easy passage of a lengthy 
“social concept statement” that certainly broke new ground for Orthodox social 
ethics. In addition, the bishops approved a lengthy statement on religious pluralism, 
formally titled Osnovnyi printsipy otnosheniia russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi k 
 
2According to a statement by Met. Kirill as reported by Irina Melnikov, “On 
Divorce, Abortion and Cloning” Segodnia 1 November 2000, in English translation 
in PDS Russia Religion News November 2000, 
(http://www.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/0011a.html.)  
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inoslaviu [Basic Principles for the Relationship of the Orthodox Church to Other 
Faiths].3
 It seems prudent to sketch out the larger contextual framework for this 
subject before addressing issues raised by Professors Bird and Agadjanian, or 
developing the main points of the pluralism theme. We are faced with a curious pre-
history that must be seen to recognize the truly major significance of ROC actions 
in August of 2000. To my knowledge there has never been a comprehensive 
statement on social ethics by the Russian Orthodox church, or any other part of 
Orthodoxy.4 Some readers will recall the discomfort with which the late Father 
Florovsky addressed the broadly held assumption that Orthodoxy lacked not only a 
social doctrine, but appeared not to care about society.5 I found myself thinking 
back to the time in the 6th century when Emperor Justinian in the 6th Novella 
articulated the desired relationship between the temporal and spiritual rulers of what 
came to be known as Byzantium. He thought in terms of the Kingdom of God as 
already partially realized in a Simfonia of common commitments and specified a 
division of duties between the Pentarchy of bishops/patriarchs and the Emperor as a 
kind of secular bishop. That Simfonia relationship was restated by Patriarch Photius 
in the 9th century, more so on behalf of churchly and theological interests, in the 
Epanagoge. Have we now reached the stage, where that Simfonia theory of church 
 
3I am relying on the Russian text as it appeared in http://www.russian-orthodox-
church.org.ru/s2000r13.htm, the official web-site of the Russian Orthodox Church. 
“Inoslavie” should etymologically be related to “Pravoslavie”, thus contrasting 
“right praise” with “strange/foreign praise”. I have chosen to translate it as “Other 
Faiths” so it fits better into common terminology about dialogue with Other Faiths 
that can mean “other Christian confessions”, as it does in this document, or to Inter-
Religious dialogue with other religions. 
4Met. Kirill was quoted by Irina Melnikova as explaining that the “doctrine is not a 
transitory document and while it may not be of interest to uninformed people, for 
theologians it is even radical because the church has never before formulated its 
views on social questions.” (PDS Russia Religion News...1 November 2000). 
5For example his essay of 1950 on “The Social Problem in the Eastern Orthodox 
Church”, reprinted in Christianity and Culture,  Vol. 2 of the Collected Works of 
Georges Florovsky, Belmont MA: Nordland Publishing Co., 1974, 131-142. 
 4
and state, which has for many centuries been totally unsuitable for the realities of 
Orthodoxy’s place in totalist governing institutions such as the Ottoman or Soviet 
Empires, has now been replaced with a social doctrine that addresses the realities of 
the context from a recognizably Orthodox perspective? 
 The year 2000 marked the beginning of a major 33 year initiative in Russia 
known as Khristianstvo (Christianity) - 2000. This initiative has not attracted much 
popular attention in the West so far, but its imaginative vision and capacity for 
deeply impacting Russian society reminds one of the foundation building impact of 
the ten year program launched by Cardinal Wyszinski in Poland in the early 1960s, 
in which the Light and Life movement and the Worker’s Solidarnosc union 
thereafter make sense. Khristianstvo - 2000 seeks to engage thinking church leaders 
with other societal leaders by means of conferences, study projects, in order to 
address major issues from a Christian perspective. The many topics addressed in the 
Social Concept statement will no doubt become themes for the year as 
Khristianstvo - 2000 proceeds toward its climax in 2030-33 when focusing on the 
life of Christ. 
 
II. RESPONSE TO THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE AND CANONISATION 
ASSESSMENTS 
 A key point that Tom Bird highlighted in his systematic review of the 
religious, social and political aspects of the decision approved at the Jubilee Synod 
of 2000 to declare Tsar Nicholas II a “holy passion-bearer” helps us account for the 
logic linking the Social Doctrine statement, the Religious Pluralism statement and 
the Canonisation. At issue was the healing of the division between the ROC and the 
Russian Orthodox Church [Outside Russia] (ROCOR). ROCOR’s three-fold 
critique of the ROC was the latter’s fateful declaration of loyalty and subservience 
to Soviet power in 1927, a stance referred to as Sergianism. Secondly there was 
ROCOR’s anti-ecumenical stance, and its Monarchism, especially its wish to have 
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the Patriarchate canonize the Imperial Family.6 The August 2000 synod therefore 
was a deliberate response detailing a social doctrine (much more extensive than 
mere church-state relations), a nuanced ecumenism, and a restrained 
acknowledgment of the passion-bearing of the Tsar and his family when executed, 
that was in the tradition of Saints Boris and Gleb. Would the ROCOR respond with 
overtures to reconciliation? Tom Bird quite rightly doubted that unity would follow, 
though ROCOR’s Council of Bishops meeting October 14, 2000 declared that the 
new social doctrine “in essence cancels out the 1927 “Declaration” of Metropolitan 
Sergious by acknowledging the supremacy of the commandments of God over those 
demands of temporal powers...” 
 Since then ROCOR has been struggling internally between the stance of the 
supporters of the new primate Archbishop Lavr and that of the aging former Met. 
Vitaly, who resigned in July of 2001, then attempted to retract and began appointing 
new bishops. It is a struggle between the “unreconciled” and the “pacifists” (those 
seeking the peace of the church).7  
 This is why, in our attempt to assess the Jubilee Sobor’s major actions it is 
necessary to examine each action as a theological issue to see how serious was the 
theological work, and to clarify the social and political dynamics as well. For 
example, since 1991 Russia has been seeking to reconstruct civil society without 
consensus on the cultural, intellectual and moral basis for doing so. A necessary 
question therefore is to ask whether the ROC will lead well in demonstrating the 
value of Orthodox intellectual theological culture for grounding the desirable 
modern society Russia wants to be. That is different from simply asserting that 
Russia was traditionally Orthodox and needs to revert to some status quo ante in its 
civil society quest. Patriarch Alexei stated at a news conference on November 5, 
 
6Thomas Bird, “St. Nicholas II: Religious, Social and Political Aspects of 
Canonization”, AAASS panel on Russian Orthodoxy After the Bishops Council of 
2000, Arlington VA November 2001., p. 7. 
7See for example, “Unreconciled Vitaly Replaced by Cautious Laurus” Obshchaia 
Gazeta, November 7, 2001. English translation at 
http://www.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/0111b.html. 
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2001 that “there is not a single church, including the Russian foreign church 
[meaning ROCOR], that can depart into isolation. We live in this world and we 
should, and we will deal with people of other confessions and religious beliefs.”8
 Alex Agadjanian titled his assessment of the Social Doctrine statement as 
both “breakthrough to modernity” and “apology of traditionalism”. Agadjanian 
views the Social Doctrine (SD) as “first official, though indirect ... response to 
independent theological modernism of Christian East ... mainstream trends in 
Western culture... postmodernity as a whole”. His primary intent, in recognizing the 
unique genre of the SD, is to examine the “grand vistas” evident in the document 
“(through a long section on its ‘Vision of the World’), to identify the major 
contemporary challenges as perceived by the ROC and how to rate the responses - 
the stance on specific social doctrines - an a scale of “innovation-conservatism”.9
 Perhaps the broad theme running through is the observation that the SD 
seeks to provide a “justification of the world as a legitimate object of the Church’s 
specific activities.”10 Since this places the drafters in opposition to the world-
resisting strategy associated with black clergy or Russian monasticism, and more so 
on the side of the white clergy, including locating the SD somewhat in the lineage 
of the Church Reforms of the 1860s, of 1905 and of later renovationists [though 
neither Agadjanian nor the document make any mention of the Iz pod Glyb writings 
of the 1970s, curiously],11 Agadjanian in essence draws attention to the way in 
which - on many new social challenges - the SD offers creative, new (borrowed?) 
responses, whereas the conservatives get their satisfaction in the stances taken on 
church, nation and on military service. 
 
8PDS Russia Religion News, November 2001 (.../relnews/0111b.html) 
9Alexander Agadjanian, “Breakthrough to Modernity, Apology of Traditionalism. 
Russian Orthodox View of Society and Culture.” (AAASS panel on Russian 
Orthodoxy After Bishops Council of 2000, Arlington VA Nov. 2001) p. 3. 
10Ibid. 
11Known in English translation as Alexander Solzhenitsyn, ed. From Under the 
Rubble. (London: Collins & Harvell, 1975.) 
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 Surely there are two responses to the SD of the ROC that are of special 
interest. One is the implicit dialogue within the ROC leadership that is accounted 
for in the way the SD was put together, and in the way the SD became a point of 
discussion. One particularly striking, nearly promising feature, was the initial 
response of ROCOR, suggesting that the SD represented an abandonment of 
Sergievism toward a stance of conditional subservience to a state, therefore a major 
barrier to reunification of ROC and ROCOR seemed to be removed. The 
subsequent interactions reveal how tricky such a re-union will be. Secondly, the 
Russian Duma itself began a ‘reading’ of the SD in April of 2001, intending to 
finish it by January 2002. That is, the SD is to provide a key point of reference for 
the current development of social policy by the state, and the renewed effort to 
articulate policy vis-a-vis the churches. (I will return to this point later by 
summarizing a major critique of the emerging state social policy, as articulated by 
the most prominent Baptist leader in today’s Russia, Iurii Sipko.) 
 The other response of particular interest here is the way in which other 
Christian traditions are beginning to respond to the SD. Although Agadjanian 
resorted to speaking of a “western” intellectual response, he ended up describing a 
liberal Protestant philosophical tradition as representing the West, not necessarily so 
recognized by other members of Western Protestant theology. That is, we probably 
need to await how ‘readers’ of the SD approaching it from Reformed, Lutheran, 
Free Church, Anglican, etc. perspectives would highlight key features. Agadjanian 
utilized the recent big Catechism of the Roman Catholic Church as somewhat like 
in genre to the SD, in order to contrast a more world embracing strategy he found in 
that Catechism with the retention of a world-resisting strategy in the SD. 
 I am not at all sure that is persuasive, on two grounds. For one, all Christian 
traditions have necessarily found themselves incorporating the ‘in this world but not 
of this world’ stance recommended by Jesus, hence world resisting or world 
embracing descriptors always required nuancing. Secondly, the recent shifts in 
emphasis of Catholic social doctrine as noticed in Papal statements and encyclicals 
in response to the post 1989 bipolar world are not part of the Catechism. In a recent 
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set of essays conveying Catholic theological discourse on this issue in Hungary, the 
key themes that emerged were ‘solidarity’and ‘sozialstaat’, the latter signaling 
concerns for framing social doctrine within a state or society that had abandoned its 
Marxist postulates, but retained a strong sense of obligations to maintain a social 
net to support the needy, not surrendering them to the vagaries of unbridled 
capitalism.12
 As noted above, ROCOR detected some affirmation of a prophetic stance 
toward misuse of state power when needed, but that is not quite the same as placing 
ROC within the trajectory of Christian churches speaking prophetically and calling 
for justice, as a way of contributing to a democratization of society. American 
Orthodox ethicist Alexander Webster has published two books in which he 
addressed Orthodox social ethics that would be true to the longer tradition. In The 
Price of Prophecy he distinguished between a transfigurative morality that should 
shape how the church behaved ethically, and a civilizing morality to be applied in 
working cooperatively with other societal forces toward the common good.13 In 
light of the way Russian and other East European Orthodox leaders had essentially 
served as propagandists and collaborators for the Soviet authorities, Webster found 
the prophetic voice in either the civilizing or transfigurative sense wanting. In a 
later work, Webster then pointed out that Orthodoxy did not have a well developed 
justifiable war doctrine, as the West had developed it through its crusade ethic, then 
drew on the charcteristics of Kievan Rus as defined by Fedotov decades ago, to 
show how Orthodoxy could recover a pacifist ethic that was more theologically 
rooted (in the love of God, in kenosis, etc.) than was Protestant pacifism that he 
 
12J. Michael Schnarrer, hsgb. Solidarität und Sozialstaat. Wien-Budapest: Verein 
zur Förderung der katholischen Soziallehre, c/o Institute für Ethik und 
Sozialwissenschaften der Universität Wien, 2000. 
13Alexander Webster, The Price of Prophecy: The Eastern Orthodox Churches on 
Peace, Freedom, and Security. (Washington DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 
1992. p. 7f. 
 9
                                                
regarded as too instrumentalist.14 Such limited references to American Orthodox 
ethical writing are intended to point to the degree to which the SD relied quite 
explicitly on western arguments for just war when rejecting a pacifist option.15
 
III. THE ESSENCE OF THE ROC STATEMENT ON RELIGIOUS 
PLURALISM OR ECUMENISM - What is Says and Fails to Say 
 Perhaps the most essential point to make about the 13 page statement of 
Basic Principles on the Relationship of the ROC to Other Faiths, is to observe the 
timing. There was some obvious parallelism with the appearance of Dominus Jesus, 
including the way in which the theological foundational statements had the effect of 
setting clear limits - perhaps recreating barriers to dialogue - before moving into 
specific themes where the nuancing signaled how far specific dialogues or 
relationships had moved. In the Russian Orthodox case, the statement on 
ecumenism is that of a national church - though much of the theological foundation 
section seeks anchoring in the patristic tradition - not a panOrthodox document yet. 
In addition, this document clearly responds to the anti-ecumenical voices and 
concerns about proselytising in Russian Orthodox ‘canonical territory’ by 
reasserting that Orthodox is the true church, that the only model for overcoming the 
fragmentation of Christianity to consider is one of repentance, conversion and 
recovery of unity within the one Orthodox church. 
 Yet once those tones have been enunciated so unequivocally, the real point 
of the document seems to be to explain to those anti-ecumenists the self-conscious, 
highly nuanced policies of ecumenical dialogue to which it calls. Allow me to 
summarize the essentials of the ‘unity we [ROC] seek’ as articulated in the basic 
principles, then address more critically precisely where the document seeks to 
 
14Alexander Webster, The Pacifist Option. The Moral Argument Against War in 
Eastern Orthodox Theology. Bethesda MD: International Scholars Publications, 
1998. pp 243-64. 
15See section VIII “War and Peace”, whose tone is rather different from the long 
opening section on II. Church and Nation and III Church and State. 
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locate present ROC relationships with other Christians - there is really nothing on 
inter-faith dialogue - that was the primary concern of Dominus Jesus. 
Basic principles of Christian Unity 
 The opening section “The unity of the Church and the Sin of Human 
Division” declares that the church is one, holy, catholic (sobornaia) and apostolic. It 
is the one body of Christ, one head (Christ) and one Spirit that provides the 
dynamism and unites all into the one body. The church overcomes the barriers of 
race, language, class, it overcomes enmity and alienation. The church has an 
ecumenical character, is a eucharistic community. The unity of the apostolic church 
is based on apostolic succession from the holy apostles.  Where there is the bishop, 
there are the people. 
 A further set of principles (20 in the first category alone) spell out that ‘only 
in connection with a concrete congregation’ can one participate in the church; and 
to be excommunicated was to be excluded from the eucharistic community. Then 
follow the recognition that over the centuries not only were individuals 
excommunicated, but also there were schisms, even within Orthodoxy. In tones 
reminiscent of Dominus Jesus, Section 1.15 states that salvation is possible only 
through the church, but those who are no longer in union with Orthodoxy [i.e. the 
Church] should not be viewed as totally without blessing, just without the claim to 
fullness. Sections 1.16 and 1.17 become more precise in noting that the signs that 
unite with non-Orthodox are those who acknowledge the Word of God, who believe 
in Jesus Christ and who show sincere piety. These provide the basis for seeking a 
Christian relationship, but Russian Orthodoxy differentiates in how it relates to 
other churches. That includes the acknowledgment of not confusing true Orthodoxy 
with ‘the national cultural tradition’, nor should Orthodoxy when claiming to be the 
true church in its teaching, structure and spiritual practice ignore its tragic 
shortcomings, or idealize some past. This section concludes by mourning the 
historical tragedy of schism, declaring that Christian division is an ‘open wound’ of 
the body of Christ. 
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 That leads to arguments for striving for restoration of Christian unity, first 
by examining models for unity to be rejected.16 That included rejecting ‘invisible 
unity’, or viewing the differences as merely cultural. The road to unity is to be seen 
as a Divine gift, it must be experienced at its deepest in the Tainstvo (Mysterium), 
and in the essentials of a lived faith. 
 There follows a major section on Bearing Witness to Non-Orthodox as 
primary motive for involvement in ecumenism. We might observe that this sets up 
proselytism toward Orthodoxy as the only stance for its ecumenical involvement. 
Nevertheless, the fourth section (11 points) does indeed present a developed 
theology of dialogue. Dialogue must be more than two monologues, where the 
partners do indeed seek to understand, are open to fellowship, to find a common 
theological language, BUT temporary agreements of compromise along the way are 
not possible. The section includes detailed proposals for study centers, exchanges of 
scholars, and cooperation on numerous social service projects of an ecumenical 
nature. 
 The fifth section sets clear parameters for participation in inter-Christian 
organizations, urges greater priority to theological dialogues, but also encourages 
involvement in local and regional church councils. 
Relations to NonOrthodox within Canonic Territory and Rules of Behavior 
 This section presumes but does not specifically delineate the actuality of 
ROC ‘canonical territory’. But within that territory, it seeks to coordinate 
cooperation with ‘other traditional confessions’, but with agreement not to 
proselytize each other. As to various other foreign confessions, point 6.3 
distinguishes between those with a trinitarian and christological faith from those 
other ‘sects’, affirming the right of such Christian groups to teach the faith to those 
“that have traditionally belonged to them”. In any case, so the 7th section, Orthodox 
 
16One wonders whether this was a response to Harding Meyer, That All May Be 
One. Perceptions and Models of Ecumenicity. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 
1999 (in German as Oekumenische Zielvorstellungen, Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1996), a most instructive and handy guide to numerous models. 
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individuals should conduct themselves with respect, avoid offending, and seek to be 
accurately informed, not repeating old stereotypes. 
 In short, what we see is a plea for continuity and possible progress in 
ecumenism, by reminding the bishops what the theological basis for unity must be, 
and what the self-limiting goals of the great variety of involvements must be. Thus 
it is easy to note the internal contradictions, including on understandings of 
proselytism and canonic territory or ‘whose people are they’ notions. Assuming this 
document will not remain the final formulation, a charitable reading helps one see 
the pleading for recognizing the marks of true Christian faith in the other, to seek to 
understand better, etc. 
Historical Appendix - as Definitely more than a Curiosity 
 The appendix, representing nearly 60% of the document as a whole, is in 
many ways the most interesting to ecumenists from other traditions, for it represents 
an assessment of the state of numerous bi-lateral dialogues, and of the relationship 
of the ROC to the WCC, which “was always difficult.” As appendix (prilozhenie) it 
is somewhat ambiguous, whether the formal approval of the document at the 
August 2000 Sobor applied to it as well. There are three basic parts: a short 
historical survey and summary, a review of bi-laterals, and a recounting of the 
ROC-WCC relationship from a current ROC perspective. 
 The introduction seeks to anchor present developments in a much longer 
history. The ROC first entered into dialogue with other confessions at the beginning 
of the 18th century - no details are given or cited. In the mid 19th century theological 
dialogue began with the Anglicans, Old Catholics and “PreChalcedonians” [now 
referred to - so also later in the document - as Oriental Orthodox]. The most 
important work for developing a theological basis for dialogue was done by the 
Petersburg-Rotterdam Commission between 1892 and 1914, between the ROC and 
Old Catholics. Having listed specific dates for bi-lateral dialogue, the appendix than 
provides short summaries, and sometimes an assessment of each. 
 With reference to dialogue with the Oriental Orthodox, the document notes 
preliminary talks since 1961, official talks since 1985, but skips the resolution on 
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full-communion.17 It moves on to cite ROC statements of 1997 that stress a spirit of 
fraternity and mutual understandings, then cites statements from 1990 (Chambessy) 
and the 1999 Holy Synod to affirm continuation of theological dialogue, especially 
along the lines of a common Christological formula. In short, restraint in the 
relationship, but not rejection as called for by the Mt. Athos monks. 
 The statement reviewing relationships with the Roman Catholic Church 
notes that this church is recognized as having preserved apostolic succession, but 
differences in tradition and spiritual experience have occurred. Without mentioning 
the 1965 lifting of anathemas between Rome and Byzantium, the appendix stresses 
that the two major topics of dialogue are the uniate question and proselytism. At 
present, the most immediate form of interaction will be to strengthen regional ties 
between dioceses, and with Catholic Bishops Conferences. 
 In a much longer section on the long story of dialogue with the Anglicans 
the writers pointed out that by 1976 agreements on seven issues had been reached, 
the Anglicans resolving to recite the Nicene Creed henceforth without the Filioque 
insertion. Yet not long after it became clear that there was not much resonance in 
the Anglican world for eliminating Filioque, but there emerged deep problems in 
relationship when the Anglicans began ordaining women, which “is alien to Church 
Tradition”.  Dialogue with Old Catholics and Lutherans get summaries with less 
advocacy to continue, though one point noted without commentary, is that ROC 
dialogue with Lutherans in the GDR raised the question of “Two Kingdom” 
theology (the Lutheran relationship to the state). 
 The second half of the appendix on participation in the ecumenical 
movement begins as the story of a century. It is important to distinguish, so the 
document, between the ‘ecumenical movement’ and ‘ecumenical contacts with 
Orthodoxy’. There follows a long section on why contacts must be seen as a way of 
 
17
For a helpful delineation of the story of the dialogue toward full communion and 
lifting of anathemas between Oriental and Eastern Orthodox, see Ion Bria, The 
Sense of Ecumenical Tradition. The Ecumenical Witness and Vision of the 
Orthodox. Geneva: WCC Publications, 1991. 
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witness, but not as recognition by Orthodoxy of other churches in a full 
ecclesiological sense. Specifically the Toronto declaration of 1950 paved the way 
for eventual joining with the WCC after 1961, so that now the majority of Orthodox 
churches are part of the WCC. Nevertheless, the protestantizing ethos of the WCC 
has remained a constant problem for Orthodox, who resist framing the problem of 
Christian unity in terms of inter-denominationalism. Hence the ROC maintains a 
position of “constructive criticism” toward the WCC, having decided in 1997 to 
remain as member but succeeded a year later with other Orthodox churches to get 
the 8th Assembly to approve a special commission for relations with the Orthodox.  
 
IV. WHICH DEBATE WILL MATTER MOST?- CHRISTIAN MORALITY 
FOR RUSSIAN STATE RE-FORMATION TODAY 
 With the new millennium, the Russian Duma and the press began 
discussions about how to develop a policy for church-state relations when seeking 
to establish or articulate basic values for a secular state. Two drafts of a doctrine of 
church-state relations for a secular state became known. 
 On Oct. 10, 2001 Iurii Tsipko, then vice-president [now President] of the 
Russian Baptist Union, in an article in Nezavisimaia Gazeta, weighed in with a 
carefully thought through statement. Whereas he had long held the view that the 
state did not need a church-state doctrine, just as they did not need a council for 
religious affairs, largely because of his commitments to separation of church and 
state, he had now come to see the necessity of a state doctrine of church-state 
relations as “necessary step in the development of democracy”.18 The primary point 
of his article is to address the contrasts in the two drafts of such a doctrine that have 
been put forward. 
 Though the paper merits detailed analysis, for our purposes here it is useful 
to point out that his main anxieties have to do with a failure by the drafters of the 
 
18Iurii Tsipko, “Two Doctrines and Seven Principles. Russian Baptists on 
Alternative Drafts of Church-State Relations”, Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 10 October 
2001, in English translation at 
http://www.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/0110c.html.  
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statements to present an assessment of the historical experience of relations (tsarist 
and Soviet), and to avoid the generic definitions of religion that are to serve equally 
for Buddhism, Islam, Orthodox and contemporary Protestants, like his community 
of Evangelical Christian Baptists. When discussing the seven main principles that 
the two doctrines have in common - a secular state, legal equality of religious 
associations, and related principles of oversight that he hopes will not again be 
forms of “interference”, his most telling remarks are that “there is no openness in 
our society”. And perhaps most to the point, the press in writing about the topic, is 
“preaching a single confession and thereby is affecting citizen’s frame of mind”. At 
points the press reveals an aggressiveness that must be regarded as “in some 
violation of the article of the laws forbidding incitement of antireligious discord...” 
Assuming also that as seems likely, a resurrected council of religious affairs will be 
staffed not by atheists, but by “our Orthodox brethren”, Tsipko wonders “Will there 
be room for us on the “canonical”territory of our homeland.” 
A Final Comment 
 This returns us to the question of the relevance of the Social Doctrine and 
Religious Pluralism statements for complicating the discourse. Key players whose 
perceptions of the desirable direction of the discourse are very different when the 
players are the Russian Orthodox (meaning more than the bishops), or when they 
are the shapers of state policy, or when they are the other believers and persons of 
no faith in Russian society. Let us hope the discussion will be extensive and 
inclusive.  
 Let us also keep in mind, however, that we are living in a world learning to 
think globally, including the global expression of Christianity, that now makes the 
categories of Orthodox and Catholic/Protestant much less relevant, in particular the 
notion of canonic territory. These ROC documents do not really address the 
complex of issues to face at an international level. Let us hope that the time for 
thinking from a global perspective will not tarry as long as have these nevertheless 
welcome statements on church unity and church in the world. 
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